The Immigration Policy Puzzle by P. Giordani & M. Ruta
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Immigration Policy Puzzle
Giordani, Paolo and Ruta, Michele
LUISS ”Guido Carli”University, World Trade Organization
2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23584/
MPRA Paper No. 23584, posted 30. June 2010 / 16:31
The Immigration Policy Puzzle
Paolo E. Giordaniy
LUISS "Guido Carli" University
Michele Rutaz
World Trade Organization
Abstract
This paper revisits the puzzle of immigration policy: standard economic theory predicts
that free immigration improves nativeswelfare, but (with few historical exceptions) an open
door policy is never implemented in practice. What rationalizes the puzzle? We rst review the
model of immigration policy where the policy maker maximizes national income of natives net of
the tax burden of immigration (Borjas, 1995). We show that this model fails to provide realistic
policy outcomes when the receiving regions technology is described by a standard Cobb-Douglas
or CES function, as the optimal policy imposes a complete ban on immigration or implies an
unrealistically large number of immigrants relative to natives. Then the paper describes three
extensions of this basic model that reconcile the theory with the evidence. The rst introduces
a cost of integration of the immigrant community in the destination country; the second takes
into account the policy makers redistributive concern across di¤erent social groups; the last
extension considers positive spillover e¤ects of (skilled) migrants on the receiving economy.
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1 Introduction
At the risk of some oversimplication, we can isolate two features that generally characterize
immigration policy. First, while immigration restrictions vary (sometimes to a large extent) across
countries, virtually all countries impose at least some limits to the entry of foreign citizens and very
few impose a complete ban on immigration.1 In other words, when optimally choosing immigration
policy, countries avoid the "corner solutions" of fully closing or fully opening the door to foreign
workers and prefer the "interior solution" of limited entry. Second, the number of foreign citizens is
always a (relatively low) fraction of the population of natives in the receiving country.2 A positive
theory of immigration policy should be consistent with these stylized facts.
Economists have developed a simple framework to study the welfare e¤ects of immigration
from the perspective of a receiving economy (see Borjas (1994) and Borjas (1995) for a survey
of the economics literature on immigration). In the baseline model, with a standard constant-
return-to-scale (CRS) technology in labor and capital, the e¤ect of immigration on nativeswelfare
is captured via changes in labor supply, while keeping (native-owned) capital xed. It is easy
to prove that, on net, foreign workers unambiguously raise national welfare as they increase the
benets accruing to native capitalists by more than the costs they impose on native workers. This
positive di¤erence between benets and costs is usually called immigration surplus. The optimal
immigration policy is then an "open door" policy. However, as we do never observe "open door"
1No OECD country completely bans legal immigration nor has a free immigration policy. Free (or even subsidized)
immigration was common in the New World at the beginning of the First Global Century (1820-1915). Even then,
however, there was a gradual and persistent increase of restrictions to immigration after the 1880s (see Hatton and
Williamson, 2005).
2 In OECD countries, the average of foreign born population over total native population varied between 10.6
percent in 1995 and 11.6 percent in 2004. In countries where the gures where highest, Luxemburg, Australia and
Switzerland, the stock of immigrants was respectively of 33.1, 23.6 and 23.5 percent of the native population for the
year 2004 (OECD data).
2
policies across receiving countries, the theory presents us with a clear policy puzzle.3
Quite intuitively, there must be some additional cost of immigration which is not taken into
consideration in the framework above and which may reconcile the theory with observed immigra-
tion policies. Accordingly, an important branch of the literature argues that, in presence of welfare
programs enacted in receiving countries, this cost may be the scal burden that immigrants impose
on native taxpayers. In other words, as immigrants may rely on public expenditures more than
they contribute to the tax system, immigration may lower nativeswelfare by increasing net tax
payments.
This approach suggests a simple solution for the optimal immigration policy of a receiving
economy: the policy maker should set restrictions to optimally trade o¤ the economic benets (i.e.,
immigration surplus) and costs (in terms of welfare state) of immigration. In the words of Borjas
(1995, p. 18):
If we are willing to maintain the hypothesis that immigration policy should increase
the national income of natives, the governments objective function in setting immigra-
tion policy is well dened: maximize the immigration surplus net of the scal burden
imposed by immigrants on native taxpayers. The optimal size and skill composition of
the immigrant ow would equate the increase in the immigration surplus resulting from
admitting one more immigrant to the marginal cost of the immigrant.
In this paper we show that this argument su¤ers of a fundamental problem and, therefore, does
not (by itself) solve the immigration policy puzzle. If the production technology has a standard
3 In a more general framework, where both natives and foreigners are heterogenous in their capital endowments
and where the latter can bring capital with them when migrating, Benhabib (1996) shows that the immigration
policy chosen by any native type (an thus also by the average representative type) is also a corner solution, where
the capital-labor ratio is either maximized or minimized. See also footnote 5.
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form (Cobb-Douglas or, more generally, CES), then this framework delivers a policy prediction that
is inconsistent with the stylized facts described above. Namely, depending on parameter values,
the optimal immigration policy is either a corner solution (i.e. closed or open door), or it implies
an interior solution which allows for unrealistically high levels of immigration - for instance, the
optimal number of immigrants is higher than the entire native population in the case of a Cobb-
Douglas technology. The reason for this result is that, with the above standard technologies, the
immigration surplus not only increases with the number of migrants but tends to increase at an
increasing rate, and linear scal costs do not guarantee that the optimal immigration policy is an
interior of the maximization problem. In short, this family of models fails to provide a positive
theory of immigration policy.
The next question is, obviously, whether the approach above may still provide the foundation
for a positive theory of immigration policy. In other words, we are interested in the conditions under
which the economic model with standard technology delivers solutions that are consistent with the
stylized facts of immigration. Without the pretension of being exhaustive, we focus on three
"solutions" to the puzzle. First, we introduce congestion e¤ects of immigration due to the rising
cost of integrating an enlarging community of foreign workers in the receiving society. Second,
we provide a political economy extension of the model where the government weighs di¤erently
di¤erent groups of natives in society (e.g. workers versus capitalists). Finally, we allow for positive
externalities of (skilled) foreign workers on the technology of the receiving economy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic model and presents
the immigration policy puzzle. Section 3 analyzes the solutions to the puzzle. Concluding remarks
follow.
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2 The Immigration Policy Puzzle
We begin by introducing the general structure of the economic model of immigration policy as
surveyed by Borjas (1995). The economy of the receiving country produces competitively one nal
good via a CRS technology in capital (K) and labor (L)
Y = F (K;L) ; (1)
where @F=@K > 0; @F=@L > 0 and @2F=@K2; @2F=@L2 < 0. The nal good is the numeraire
in this economy, and its price is normalized to one. As the product market is competitive, input
factors are paid their marginal productivities:
wH =
@Y
@L
and rH =
@Y
@K
:
Capital is in xed amount and is only owned by a fraction of natives (called capitalists), while
labor is the sum of native (LH) and foreign (LF ) labor, L = LF +LH . Agents use their income to
purchase the nal good and have a linear utility function in consumption.
We dene immigration policy as the choice of the exact number LF of foreign workers to be
admitted. This feature of the model can be easily generalized by introducing endogenous foreign
labor supply responding to immigration policy (see for instance Giordani-Ruta, 2009). Also assume
that LF 2

0; LF

. It is then easy to interpret LF = 0 and LF = LF as the two extreme immigration
policies, which we call respectively "closed door" and "open door" policies.
In this setting, we can equivalently dene aggregate welfare in this economy (i) as the sum of
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factor payments to natives:
H  wH (LF )  LH + rH (LF ) K; (2)
and (ii) as the di¤erence between total production in the economy and the fraction of it which
accrues to immigrants:
H  F (K;L)  LFwH : (3)
We will conveniently use either of these denitions in what follows.
Let us initially focus on (3). It is a well known result that, in this simple setting (without
scal costs of immigration), the optimal immigration policy is an "open door" policy. In fact, it is
@H
@LF
=  LF @wH
@LF
> 0 8LF > 0; (4)
and is equal to zero only when LF = 0. As a result, the welfare function is everywhere increasing in
L, and the optimal policy is LF = LF . In this setting migrants increase national income by more
than it costs to employ them. The net positive e¤ect is generally referred to as the immigration
surplus. Namely, immigration increases labor supply in the destination country, thus lowering the
equilibrium wage (@wH=@LF < 0). The negative e¤ect on native workers is more than compensated
by the increase in the income of capitalists - via a higher rental rate of capital (@rH=@LF > 0). As
a result, in this case there is no economic rationale for imposing any limit to the entry of foreign
workers -or, to put it di¤erently, observed immigration restrictions represent a puzzle.
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2.1 The Optimal Immigration Policy
We introduce next the scal cost of immigration. In order to focus ideas, we assume that a
social policy exists in our economy, which redistributes income from capitalists to workers. In
particular, suppose that this policy consists of a xed lump-sum transfer  to both native and
foreign workers, which is nanced through a proportional tax  2 [0; 1] on the capital rent.4 In
presence of immigration, the (balanced) budget of this policy is equal to
rHK =  (LH + LF ) ;
that is, the tax inow is equal to the lump-sum transfer times the number of both native and
foreign workers. As a result,  is an increasing function of LF , which incorporates the idea that
immigrants may constitute a scal burden for the receiving economy.
In this case, net aggregate welfare can now be dened as
NH = F (K;L)  LF (wH + ) ; (5)
which includes the scal cost of immigration to natives.
To characterize the optimal number of foreign workers LF in this economy, the necessary rst
order condition (FOC) writes as
@NH
@LF
=  LF @wH
@LF
   = 0;
which implies that a candidate interior solution for optimal immigration policy must be such that
4Naturally, one can model the social policy in the receiving country in a number of di¤erent ways. Independently
of the modeling details, the key feature of the economic framework of immigration policy is that policies in the
receiving country imply a net transfer of resources from natives to (unskilled) foreign workers.
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the marginal benet on natives income from admitting an additional foreign worker (i.e. the
increase in the immigration surplus,  LF (@wH=@LF )) needs to be equal to the marginal cost of
the immigrant for the welfare system (), as in the quote from Borjas (1995) in the Introduction.
In order for any LF solving the equation above to be - at least a local - maximum, the net
welfare function (5) needs to be concave in LF . The second derivative of the welfare function writes
as
@2NH
@L2F
=  

@wH
@LF
+ LF
@2wH
@L2F

: (6)
Notice that @2NH=@L2F may be higher or lower than zero (remember that @wH=@LF is negative).
As a result, the concavity of the welfare function is not generally assured, which implies that a
solution to the FOC can either be a maximum or a minimum. Whether the welfare function is
concave or not crucially depends on the specic technology assumed for the economy. In what
follows we will show that, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, the welfare function is convex
for all plausible values of LF (the CES technology case is discussed in appendix). In other words,
the gains from immigration increase at an increasing rate, and hence linear scal costs do not
guarantee that the optimal policy is an interior solution to the maximum problem.5
2.2 The Optimal Policy under a Cobb-Douglas Technology
Assume now that the economy produces the nal good competitively via a simple Cobb-Douglas
technology:
Y = KL1 :
5 In his more general framework but without social policy, Benhabib (1996) proves that the income function of
any native agent (and thus, as a particular case, also the welfare function) is locally convex in the only candidate
solution of the maximum problem (which is then a minimum). The equivalent (but less meaningful) result in our
model would be that, when  = 0, the welfare function is locally convex around the only candidate solution, which
is LF = 0. This is immediate to verify when one looks at (6), recalling that @wH=@LF < 0. The point LF = 0 is in
fact a minimum. Here, however, we study the concavity along the whole domain of the welfare function.
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Let us characterize the optimal number of foreign workers LF in the presence of social policy
. Substituting the Cobb-Douglas expression into (5) and di¤erentiating w.r.t. LF , we obtain the
rst order condition as
@NH
@LF
=  (1  )

K
L
 LF
L
   = 0: (7)
Let us now study the concavity of the welfare function by computing the second derivative. After
some algebra we obtain
@2NH
@L2F
=  (1  )

K
L
 1
L

LH
L
  LF
L

< 0 () LF > LH

: (8)
The above expressions show that the puzzle with immigration policy is not solved by the
presence of a scal cost. A standard form of the production function such as the Cobb-Douglas
delivers predictions in terms of optimal immigration policy outcomes that are patently inconsistent
with the basic stylized facts on immigration discussed in the Introduction. In particular, condition
(8) tells us that the welfare function is concave only for levels of immigration that contradict the
second stylized fact. Notice that even the most conservative estimates of , say  = 0:5,6 would
suggest that the optimal number of immigrants (if positive) must be at least twice the size of the
native population for the second order condition to be satised (and hence for an interior solution
to exist).
If we restrict attention to economies in which LF < LH , we nd that @2NH=@L2F > 0, and
hence that any LF solving the FOC is indeed a minimum. Since the welfare function is everywhere
strictly convex, the global maximum must be at one of the two extremes, either LF = 0 or L

F =
LF ,
and the choice between a closed door or an open door policy depends on the scal burden which
6 In growth accounting exercises a  = 1=3 is usually taken as a rough measure of the share of physical capital.
When considering both human and physical capital, then a  close to 1=2 is considered a more appropriate measure.
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immigrants impose on natives. In particular, there exists a cut-o¤ value, ^, above (below) which
it is optimal to set a closed door (open door) policy. This value, as a function of all parameters of
the model, is the one that solves the following equation:
NH (0) = NH
 
LF

;
where
NH (0) = (1  )

K
LH

LH + 

K
LH
 1
K
is the net welfare of the receiving country when immigration is fully banned, and
NH
 
LF

= (1  )

K
LH + LF

LH + 

K
LH + LF
 1
K    LF
is the net welfare that accrues to natives when all foreign workers are admitted. The value ^ is
then
^ = (1  ) LHLF

K
LH + LF

 

K
LH

+ 
K
LF
"
K
LH + LF
 1
 

K
LH
 1#
:
This implies that, for high values of the social policy in the receiving country ( > ^), the
optimal immigration policy is LF = 0, while for any  < ^, the optimal policy is to impose no
restriction to the entry of foreign workers (i.e. LF = LF ). While this nding has the realistic prop-
erty that economies with larger redistributive systems will want to set more restrictive immigration
policies, this conguration for the optimal immigration policy contradicts the rst stylized fact on
immigration, as it predicts "extreme" policy outcomes.
Before moving to analyze the solutions to the immigration policy puzzle, we discuss the in-
10
tuition behind the emergence of extreme policy outcomes. Notice once again that this result does
not hinge upon the (well known) fact that the immigration surplus is increasing in the number of
migrants. That alone would not deliver extreme policy outcomes in presence of linearly increasing
costs of immigration (as captured by the social policy in our model). These policy outcomes instead
emerge because, for realistic restrictions of the parameter space (LF < LH=), the immigration
surplus increases at an increasing rate (@2NH=@L2F > 0). That is, the positive e¤ect that foreign
workers have on pre-tax income of the receiving region increases with their number. This implies
that, if the rst immigrant that enters the receiving economy has a net positive e¤ect on the after-
tax income of natives, so will all other foreign workers. In this case, the receiving government
optimally sets no limits on immigration. Conversely, if the marginal benet of the last immigrant
to the receiving economys pre-tax income is too low relative to her scal cost, then all other foreign
workers must as well reduce the aggregate welfare of natives. For this reason, the government of
the receiving economy optimally bans immigration.
3 Solutions to the Immigration Policy Puzzle
We have seen above that introducing the scal costs of immigration is not su¢ cient to guarantee
a solution to the choice of immigration policy which is consistent with basic stylized facts on
immigration in receiving countries. If we are willing to maintain that governments do not choose
immigration policy at random but rationally weighing costs and benets from immigration, we may
reasonably suspect that the model outlined above is missing salient aspects of immigration costs
and/or benets, which are instead taken into account by destination countries. In this section we
introduce three possible variations of the above model, which can reconcile the theoretical results
on immigration policy with the empirical evidence.
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3.1 Congestion E¤ects of an Increasing Immigrant Community
It is reasonable to conjecture that the costs of immigration are not only scal, but also include other
(possibly non-economic) costs such as those related to the integration of the immigrantscommunity
into the receiving society. In particular, consider the possibility that the entry of foreign workers
may produce "congestion e¤ects", in that it may become more and more di¢ cult to integrate an
increasing community of foreigners in the destination country. This would suggest that the costs
of immigration are convex in the number of immigrants, and not linear as implied by the model in
Section 2.
Assume that the overall costs of immigration are described by a twice continuously di¤er-
entiable function c (LF ), with c0 () ; c00 () > 0, c (0) = 0, c
 
LF

= c. The optimal number of
immigrants LF - and hence the optimal immigration policy - is the one which maximizes
NH = wH (LF )  LH + rH (LF ) K   c (LF ) :
Under a Cobb-Douglas technology, the new FOC is
@NH
@LF
=  (1  )

K
L
 LF
L
  c0 (LF ) = 0:
A su¢ cient condition for an LF 2
 
0; LF

satisfying the FOC to be a global interior maximum is
that the welfare function be strictly concave, that is:
@2NH
@L2F
=  (1  )

K
L
 1
L

LH
L
  LF
L

  c00 (LF ) < 0
Notice that a "su¢ ciently strong" convexity of the immigration cost function guarantees that the
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second derivative is negative. In this case an intermediate level of restrictions to immigration LF (as
opposed to an open door or closed door policy) would be an optimal solution to the maximization
problem of the receiving countrys policy maker.
To show this point, consider as an example the following cost function:7
c (LF ) = K
 L

F
 (   1) , with  > 1.
The new FOC is
@NH
@LF
=  (1  )

1
L
 LF
L
  L
 1
F
   1 = 0:
We now show that, if the cost function is "su¢ ciently convex" ( > ), the welfare function is
everywhere strictly concave, which ensures that, if LF exists which solves the FOC, it is a global
interior maximum. In fact
@2NH
@L2F
=  (1  )

1
L
+1LH
L
  LF
L

  L 2F < 0 ()
 >
ln
h
 (1  )   1L 1L LHL   LFL i
lnLF
+ 2:
Dene
h (LF ) 
ln
h
 (1  )   1L 1L LHL   LFL i
lnLF
:
It is immediate to verify that, for any LF 2 (1; LF ], h (LF ) is negative. Then, a su¢ cient condition
for the welfare function to be strictly concave in that interval is that  > 2.8 Intuitively, the
7We have in mind a simple convex function like c (LF ) = L

F , with  > 1. We introduce K
, which is exogenous
in our framework, as well as the term  (   1) at denominator to simplify the calculations and help us determine an
explicit condition on  for the concavity of the welfare function.
8A slightly di¤erent cost function could be used to obtain the same su¢ cient concavity condition over the whole
interval [0; LF ]:
c (LF ) =
K
 (   1) [(LF + a)
   a] , with  > 1, a > 1:
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equilibrium policy is an interior solution if the congestion e¤ects of immigration in the receiving
society -as captured by the cost elasticity  - are su¢ ciently strong.
3.2 The Political Economy of Immigration Policy
In Section 2 we have disregarded the redistributive implications of immigration and focused more
narrowly on its aggregate e¤ects on the receiving economy. The second variation that we analyze
here is the one of a policy maker with redistributive concerns.
Consider the model of Section 2 with scal costs of immigration. However, we now assume
that the government weighs the utility of capital owners and workers di¤erently. More specically,
consider the following problem of welfare maximization:9
max
LF
fNH  a  (rHK   LF ) + (1  a)  wHLHg ;
where LF 2

0; LF

, and a; 1   a represent the utility weights given to capitalists and workers
respectively, with a 2 [0; 1]. The FOC of this problem is
@NH
@LF
= (1  )

K
L
 
a  (1  a) LH
L

  a = 0:
The new h(LF ) corresponding to this cost function would be negative in the whole interval and would not have
discontinuity points at LF = 0; 1.
9 If the "political" weight were equal for the two groups, the objective function of the government would correspond
to the aggregate social welfare for the receiving country (as in Section 2). As it is well understood from the theory
of collective action (Olson, 1965), however, governments tend to favor better organized special interests. This may
explain deviations from pure welfare maximization. Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2007) employ a lobbying model
and provide a micro-analytic foundation to this political economy representation.
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We now turn to study the concavity of the welfare function and obtain
@2NH
@L2F
= (1  )

K
L
 1
L

(1  a) LH
L
  

a  (1  a) LH
L

< 0 ()
() LF > LH ;
where
  (1 + ) (1  a)  a
a
7 1
depending on the parameters a and .
Notice that this new condition for concavity (LF > LH) is less stringent than the one obtained
under the baseline model (LF > LH=) whenever the government has a bias towards capitalists
interests. Formally,  < 1=() a > 1=2.10 In particular, the higher the weight given to capitalists
relative to workers, the lower  (and hence the less stringent the condition on concavity). Intuitively,
while it is obviously true that the politically weighted gain from immigration is larger the higher the
consideration of capitalistsinterests in the policy maker objective function (a), this gain increases
at a decreasing rate for a su¢ ciently high value of a and is, therefore, compatible with interior
solutions for the immigration policy problem. For instance, if  = 0:3, a = 0:8, then  ' 0:08,
which implies that the welfare function is strictly concave when immigrant population is at least
8% of native population. Although such a high value of a may be unrealistic for some countries,
this simple model suggests that the introduction of policy makersredistributive concerns goes in
the direction of bringing theoretical predictions closer to the immigration policies observed across
countries.
10 Interestingly, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2007) nd evidence that in the US the government weighs capitalists
interests relatively more than workersinterests (that is, a > 1=2).
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3.3 A Simple Immigration Model with Human Capital
We nally consider a last extension of the basic model, where immigrants create positive external
e¤ects on the destination country. Specically, suppose that the knowledge of foreign workers,
particularly skilled ones, has a positive spillover onto the aggregate technology of the receiving
economy, as in the following production function:
Y = AKL1 ;
where A describes the aggregate level of technology in the receiving economy which is assumed to
depend on the number of skilled workers (for simplicity, we assume here that all labor is skilled),
that is
A = L with  2 (0; 1) : (9)
Firms take A as given and, hence, produce via a constant return to scale technology. Input
factors are paid
wH = A (1  )

K
L

and rH = A

K
L
 1
:
When maximizing the welfare of the economy however, the policy maker internalizes the
positive externality by substituting for L in the expression for A. Assuming that there are linear
scal costs associated to migrants in the form introduced in the previous section, the welfare to be
maximized is
NH = L

"
(1  )

K
L

LH + 

K
L
 1
K
#
  LF :
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We obtain the expression for the FOC as
@NH
@LF
= L

 (1  )

K
L
 LF
L

+ L 1
"
(1  )

K
L

LH + 

K
L
 1
K
#
   = 0:
The second derivative of welfare with respect to LF is
@2NH
@L2F
= 2L 1

 (1  )

K
L
 LF
L

+ L

 (1  )

K
L
 1
L

LH
L
  LF
L

   (1  )L 2
"
(1  )

K
L

LH + 

K
L
 1
K
#
:
After some algebra we obtain that
@2NH
@L2F
< 0 () LF > LH ;
where
 =
 (1  )   (1  )   (1  ) (1  )
 (1  ) + 2 (1  )  2 (1  ) ? 0:
Numerical calculations show that  is lower than zero for a wide range of reasonably chosen
parameter values. For instance, for any  2 [0:2; 0:5] we have that  < 0 - that is the welfare
function is everywhere strictly concave - for any value of  belonging to the interval [0:2; 0:65].
In all these economies a global maximum is always an interior maximum. The intuition is that
the existence of positive externalities of (foreign) skilled workers introduces an element of concavity
which might more than o¤set the convexity of total benets. In particular, each new immigrant has
a positive e¤ect on the aggregate technology of the receiving economy. However, as this knowledge
spillover is subject to diminishing returns ( < 1), the increase in the immigration gain decreases
as the country admits more foreign workers.
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4 Conclusions
The paper shows that, under standard assumptions on the production technology of the receiving
economy, the commonly used economic model of immigration policy - in which the costs and
the benets from immigration are respectively captured via a social redistributive policy and the
immigration surplus - fails to be consistent with two stylized facts on immigration. We then
analyze three extensions of this basic model which reconcile the theory with the evidence. While
not exhaustive, these three solutions provide a panoramic of the possible extensions of the basic
economic model, as the rst corresponds to a change in the cost structure of immigration, the second
introduces redistributive considerations within the receiving society, while the latter considers a
di¤erent technology. These solutions are not mutually exclusive, the relative importance of each
of the determinants of immigration policy discussed in this paper being an interesting empirical
question.
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Appendix: The Optimal Policy under a CES Technology
Assume that the technology of the receiving economy can be represented by a CES production
function:
Y =
h
bK + (1  b)L
i 1

;
where b 2 (0; 1) and  2 ( 1; 1]. As before, capital is in xed amount and is only owned by
natives, while labor is the sum of native and foreign labor, L = LF + LH . Also assume that the
economy is characterized by a social policy as the one described in the main body of the paper.
Given the expression for welfare as in (5), we can easily obtain the FOC for the welfare
maximization problem as
@NH
@LF
= (1  ) (1  b)L 2
h
bK + (1  b)L
i 1

 2
bKLF    = 0:
Let us now verify the concavity of the welfare function by computing the second derivative. After
some algebra we obtain
@2NH
@L2F
= (1  ) (1  b)L 3
h
bK + (1  b)L
i 1

 3
bK 

n
(1  b)L (LH   LF ) + bK [LH   (1  )LF ]
o
:
The expression above can be higher or lower than zero. We will now provide a su¢ cient condition
for the welfare function to be strictly convex, that is, for our policy puzzle to exist, even in presence
of scal costs of immigration. The rst multiplicative term is always positive. The rst term inside
the curly brackets is for sure positive whenever LF < LH given that   1 - in particular, it is
always positive when  2 ( 1; 0], while it is positive for any LF < LH= when  2 (0; 1]. Finally,
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notice that the second term is positive for any LF < LH= (1  ). Recalling that for a CES function
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is e  1= (1  ), we can then rewrite the
latter inequality as LF =LH < e. In other words, insofar as the ratio of immigrants over native
population lies below the value for the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, the
marginal gain from admitting an additional immigrant is increasing.
Estimates of the elasticity of substitution vary quite remarkably depending on, among others,
the data set used (time series or cross-section), the countries involved in the estimation, and the
econometric technique. These estimates, however, usually range between 0:7 and 1:4 (recent studies
include Bentolila-Saint Paul (2003) - e = 1:06 -, Antras (2004) - e between 0:8 and 1 -, Du¤y-
Papageorgiou (2000) - e = 1:4). The lowest recent estimate we are aware of is the one in Klump
et al. (2007), where e is between 0:5 and 0:7. Even if we place ourselves in this "worst case"
scenario (that is, e = 0:5), this condition - which, again, is simply su¢ cient for the welfare function
to be everywhere strictly convex - tells us that there can never exist an interior solution to the
immigration policy problem where the optimal number of immigrants is lower than half of native
population. Given the average number of immigrants across destination countries, we can exclude
that the baseline model, even under the CES, may help rationalize the immigration policy set up
across countries.
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